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THE AFTERMATH OF SERRANO: THE STRICT SCRUTINY
APPROACH AND THE VIABILITY OF PROPERTY TAX
FINANCING FOR PUBLIC EDUCATIONAL SYSTEMS
I.

INTRODUCTION

The public education systems of most states rely heavily on the property taxes raised by local school districts for the financial support of the
schools in each district.1 Thus the quality of education in a district may
depend upon and be limited by the wealth of that district. 2 A series of
recent cases has employed the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment of the federal Constitution 3 to condemn local property tax
financing of public educational systems. The leading case was Serrano
v. Priest.4 There, the Supreme Court of California held that students
and parents had stated a cause of action by alleging that California's
school finance system invidiously discriminated against residents of poor
school districts because the poorer districts offered education which was
inferior to that of other districts merely because of the disparity of
wealth.5 The novelty of such an application of the equal protection clause,
and the immediate practical effect of the decision, 6 led the court to modify
its original opinion. 7 The modification emphasized the demurrer nature
of the case and provided that if the plaintiffs prevailed, the present
system should nevertheless continue to operate until a less discriminatory
8
system could be fashioned by the state legislature.
Three cases followed which relied heavily on the Serrano analysis
in dealing with similar sets of facts. In Van Dusartz v. Hatfield,9 the
United States District Court for the District of Minnesota held that the
plaintiffs - taxpayers and parents - had stated a cause of action by making
allegations similar to those made in Serrano. In Rodriguez v. San
Antonio, 10 a three-judge court for the Western District of Texas held
that a cause of action similar to that in Serrano had been proved. Finally,
in Robinson v. Cahill," the Superior Court of New Jersey held that the
1. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1972, § 4, at 3, col. 1.
2. See notes 196-204 and accompanying text infra (discussion of equalization
attempts by the states).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, providing in part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
4. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971) (en banc).
5. Id. at 617-18, 487 P.2d at 1265, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 625.
6. See notes 87-88 infra (the immediate political impact of the Serrano decision).
7. The opinion was originally handed down on August 30, 1971, and was
modified on denial of rehearing which was filed on October 21, 1971. 77 CASE & COM.
30 (1972).
8. Id.
9. 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971).
10. 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1971) (per curiam for a three-judge court),
appeal granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3573 (U.S. June 6, 1972) (No. 71-1332).
11. 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (Super. Ct. 1972).
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state's school financing system constituted a denial of equal protection.
Notably, each court retained jurisdiction pending legislative modifications
of the systems, even though Rodriguez and Robinson were cases which
represented final decisions on the merits as to the constitutionality of
the systems.
In Sweetwater County Planning Committee v. Hinkle, 12 the Supreme
Court of Wyoming held that the Serrano result forbade the establishment of a unified school district when the basis for such unification was
the wealth of the districts rather than the educational needs of the children. The Sweetwater court went beyond any of the aforementioned
cases in that it made specific suggestions as to what would be acceptable
13
legislative rationales for a constitutionally valid districting system.
In contrast to Serrano, Van Dusartz, Rodriguez, Robinson, and
Sweetwater, but on very similar facts, the New York Supreme Court
held, in Spano v. Board of Education,14 that the plaintiff had not stated
a cause of action. The Spano court felt that the decisions of the United
States Supreme Court in Mclnnis v. Ogilvie'5 and Burruss v. Wilkerson,16 though distinguished by the Serrano court,17 were controlling.
Thus, a clear disagreement among the states makes this rapidly
developing issue' 8 ripe for decision by the United States Supreme Court,
which recently docketed the appeal in Rodriguez.' 9
The Supreme Court recently used the equal protection approach
adopted by the Serrano court in Shapiro v. Thompson.20 In Shapiro,
the Court invalidated a one-year residency requirement as a condition
to receipt of state welfare benefits. Mr. Justice Harlan, in his dissent,
outlined the majority's "compelling interest" doctrine, which the Serrano
court called the "strict scrutiny" approach, 21 and contrasted it with the
traditional "rational basis" test:
The "compelling interest" doctrine, which today is articulated

more explicitly than ever before, constitutes an increasingly significant exception to the long-established rule that a statute does not
deny equal protection if it is rationally related to a legitimate government objective. The "compelling interest" doctrine has two branches.
The branch which requires that classifications based on "suspect"
12. 491 P.2d 1234 (Wyo. 1971).
13. Id. at 1237-38. For a discussion of the Sweetwater court's suggestions, see
notes 168 & 210 and accompanying text infra.
14 . ......
N.Y.2d ......
-----N.E.2d --,-----N.Y.S.2d
(Sup. Ct. 1972).
15. 394 U.S. 322 (1969), aff'g men. sub nom. McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp.
327 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
16. 397 U.S. 44 (1970), aff'g mem., 310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969).
17. See notes 83-90 and accompanying text infra.
18. Similar suits have been filed in twenty-five states. Wall Street Journal,
Mar. 2, 1972, at 1, col. 6.
19. 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1971), appeal granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3573
(U.S. June 6, 1972) (No. 71-1332). Numerous states are expected to file briefs as
amicus curiae.
20. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
21. 5 Cal. 3d at 610, 487 P.2d at 1259, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 619. This Comment
will employ the term "strict scrutiny."
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criteria be supported by a compelling interest apparently had its
genesis in cases involving racial classifications ....
fit has been held [with regard to the second branch] that a
statutory classification is subject to the "compelling interest" test if
the result of the classification may be to affect
a "fundamental right,"
22
regardless of the basis of the classification.
The soundness of the "strict scrutiny" approach, as applied to the
problem of educational opportunity, is the subject of this Comment. After
a brief discussion of problems related to finding "state action" (a condition to the applicability of the fourteenth amendment), the designation
of education as a "fundamental interest," the designation of wealth as a
''suspect classification," and the interplay between these designations will
be scrutinized. The kinds of "state interest" which might justify unequal
treatment and the judicial approach to measuring the "compulsion" of
such state interest will then be considered. A modified strict scrutiny
test will then be proposed which will, it is submitted, more closely reflect
the approach apparently taken by the courts in the instant cases. The
suitability of the judiciary to lead the attack on educational inequality will
then be considered, followed by an analysis of the practical impact of the
instant cases on the federal system and the freedom of the states to
provide for local government decision-making.
II.

STATE ACTION

The Serrano court had no difficulty finding the presence of "state
action."'23 While the state constitution and statutes were neutral on their
face as they evidenced no intent to affect people differently according to
their wealth,2 4 the court took judicial notice of extrinsic factors relating
to the distribution of wealth among school districts 25 and recognized that
the system's effect was to create an arguably invalid discrimination. 26
22. 394 U.S. at 658-60 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).

23. Cf. 5 Cal. 3d at 601-04, 487 P.2d at 1253-55, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 613-15;

Developments in the Law: Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1070-71 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Developments: Equal Protection].
24. Indeed, the instant cases took note of the numerous equalization programs
undertaken by the states, indicating a state purpose not to discriminate by wealth.
The Serrano court noted, however, that other cases "dealing with the factor of
wealth" rejected imposition of certain "payments which, although neutral on their
face, may have a discriminatory effect." 5 Cal. 3d at 602, 487 P.2d at 1254, 96 Cal.
Rptr. at 614. Cf. Developments: Equal Protection, supra note 23, at 1080-83. There
the author explained that legislatures must not only write their laws so that they
apply equally to all members of the classes described by the legislation ("numerical
equality") but also consider certain other differences. A legislature cannot be blind
to practical extrinsic classifications that might be created.
25. In deciding the demurrer, the Serrano court took judicial notice of all
materials "contained in publications of state officers or agencies." 5 Cal. 3d at 591,
487 P.2d at 1245, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 605. The other courts also undertook extensive
examination of the facts relating to distribution of wealth and educational benefits.
See, e.g., 118 N.J. Super. at 235-46, 287 A.2d at 193-99.
26. In other areas of the law, the lack of any discrimination on the face of
legislation has not saved it from judicial scrutiny in the light of extrinsic circum-
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The court properly dismissed the defendants' contention that this
was purely de facto discrimination and therefore not "state action." It
recognized that a de jure/de facto distinction had little meaning 27 where,
as here, governmental involvement in every facet of the school system,
from the drawing of school district lines to the distribution of school funds,
was obvious.28 However, the case may lend support for future invalida29
tion of de facto racial segregation in schools.
Two further observations with reference to the threshhold finding of
"state action" are appropriate at this point. The question of "action"
versus "inaction"30 tends to pervade these cases, though it is not explicitly discussed. 3' When a state has undertaken to remedy a social problem, courts have generally granted relief for unequal treatment only
when the classification, on which distribution of the remedial benefits is
32
based, is not rationally related to the problem intended to be remedied.
Thus, if the state action does not remedy the entire problem, the courts
have nevertheless refrained from requiring the state to do more than it
has already undertaken. 3 This question of state "inaction" may serve
to distinguish another recent case, Dandridge v. Williams,3 4 which is
stances. Cf. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
27. 5 Cal. 3d at 603-04, 487 P.2d at 1255, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 615. The Serrano
court pointed out that wealth classifications do not lend themselves to de facto/
de jure categorization and should not be controlled by analogy to permissible de facto
racial segregation, especially in light of California's stance against such segregation.
Id. at 603-04 n.20, 487 P.2d at 1255 n.20, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 615 n.20. Notably, the
Rodriguez, Van Dusartz, and Robinson cases did not distinguish Serrano on this point.
28. See 5 Cal. 3d at 602-04 & nn.18-20, 487 P.2d at 1254-55 & nn.18-20, 96 Cal.
Rptr. at 614-15 & nn.18-20. The role of the state was best illustrated by the
Sweetwater situation. See Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through
the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 48-50 (1969).
29. De facto discrimination was traditionally permissible because the state had
no role in perpetuating the discrimination. With the increasing involvement of
government in all phases of activity, however, it is difficult to find an instance where
the state could not be deemed to condone discrimination if it does not actively prevent
discrimination. Cf. Kurland, Equal Educational Opportunity: The Limits of Constitutional Jurisprudence Undefined, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 583, 592-95 (1968). Professor
Kurland stated that the failure of the public to acquiesce in removing the vestiges
of de jure segregation in schools may explain the reluctance of the Supreme Court
to demand de facto segregation. Cf. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971) (5-4
decision) ; School Comm. v. Barksdale, 348 F.2d 261 (1st Cir. 1965). Strong
support for an end to de facto segregation, because it rejects the disestablishment
argument in favor of outright prohibition of all segregation is offered in Hobson v.
Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 494-97 (D.D.C. 1967), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 801
(1968), aff'd sub nom., Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Its approach
suggests that by attacking extra burdens on the poor, the equal protection clause
may accomplish what it has not done by attacking racial classifications alone. However,
the circuit court there based its affirmance partially on "the trial court's finding that
discriminatory intent underlay these [optional attendance] zones." 408 F.2d at 183.
30. See Developments: Equal Protection, supra note 23, at 1070-89.
31. Cf. Serrano, 5 Cal. 3d at 602-03, 487 P.2d at 1254, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 614.
32. Cf. YMCA v. Kugler, F. Supp. -_ (D.N.J. 1972).
33. Cf. Briggs v. Kerrigan, 307 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1969), aff'd, 431 F.2d
967 (1st Cir. 1970) (the state was allowed to offer school lunch programs in schools
according to whether or not there were existing kitchen facilities in the respective
schools).
34. 397 U.S. 471 (1970). For other bases for distinguishing Dandridge from
the instant cases, see notes 115 & 190 and accompanying text infra.
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often cited as an indication of a trend away from "strict scrutiny, '3 5 and
which is considered to be of significance in the instant cases. 30 In Dandridge, the Supreme Court held that a state could distribute welfare
benefits for dependent children and at the same time draw a line at the
fifth child per family. The decision might have been based on a recognition
that the state legitimately undertook to remedy poverty only to the extent of remedying low family income and should not be obliged, in addition,
37
to remedy the needs of every child.
In contrast to Dandridge,the case of Hobson v. Hansen,38 which was

discussed in the instant cases3 9 and which may have come closest to demanding that a state undertake more than it intended, 40 required that
the state either abandon its "tracking" system, intended to advance superior
students, or undertake to make disadvantaged students eligible. 41 As can
be seen by comparison of these two cases, the characterization of state
involvement as "action" or "inaction" may require detailed analysis by a
court and thereby merge with the final and decisive step of the "strict
scrutiny" analysis - the examination of the state's interest. 42 The mere
presence of the initial requirement of "action," not "inaction," has helped,
however, to create a balance between judicial standards for equal treatment and legislative discretion to attack problems gradually, as it becomes
economically or politically feasible to do so.43 The instant cases found
35. See Riverside v. Whitlock, __ Cal. 3d __, ___ P.2d _, 99 Cal. Rptr. 710
(1972), where the court stated that, while Serrano stood for the proposition that the
opportunity for equal education was on the list of "fundamental interests," Dandridge
suggested that the list was limited. The Whitlock court held that the equal protection
principle of one man-one vote need not be applied to a vote on gas distribution by
those owning a majority of the affected lands.
36. The Van Dusartz court thought it necessary to distinguish Dandridge. See
note 115 infra.
37. Dandridge was so interpreted in Briggs v. Kerrigan, 307 F. Supp. 295
(D. Mass. 1969). Cf. Alexander v. Swank, 314 F. Supp. 1082 (N.D. Ill.1970)
(upholding exception of college students from eligibility for AFDC benefits to
18 to 21 year-olds engaged in training programs, and relying on Dandridge). See
Note, Exclusionary Zoning and Equal Protection, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1645, 1652-53
(1971), wherein the author suggests a restricted reading of Dandridge.
38. 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967). See note 29 supra.
39. See, e.g., 5 Cal. 3d at 609 n.27, 487 P.2d at 1259 n.27, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 619
n.27.
40. Cf. Hobson v. Hansen: Judicial Supervision of the Color-Blind School
Board, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1511 (1968). See Selma Improvement Ass'n v. County
Comm'n, _ F. Supp. --- (N.D. Ala. 1972). The federal district court held that
Alabama County, with a history of failure to pave streets in black neighborhoods,
was obliged to equalize paving, even though the county had already adopted a
program to gradually lessen the differences. Id. at
41. 408 F.2d at 186-89.
42. See text accompanying notes 161-71 infra.
43. Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 655 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
See Note, supra note 37, in which the author stated:
To say this is not to import into the Constitution - as Mr. Harlan has
feared - a "philosophy of levelling." Elimination of state-created barriers to
advancement does not require states to undertake affirmative action to alleviate
poverty. . . . De facto wealth classifications demand active review only when
two conditions exist: (1) the State has acted affirmatively in some way; (2)
this act substantially impairs the social mobility of poor people. The state can
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"state action" on the basis that the respective states had undertaken statewide education systems. 44 The presence of compulsory school attendance
laws was particularly important, 45 since it helped show that the states
were undertaking legal support of all public education within the state
46
and were not merely taking a permissive, "inactive" role.

With reference to the long-range significance of the instant cases, it
should be noted that, even if they had not made findings of "state action"
for fourteenth amendment purposes, four of the cases would retain their
effect in the respective states, because they involved interpretation of
state as well as federal constitutional requirements. The Serrano court
held that the California constitutional mandate for a "system" of public
schools was not violated by decentralized financing but that provisions,
previously held to be equivalent to the federal equal protection clause,
allegedly had been violated. 47 The Robinson court held that the New
Jersey system violated the state constitutional requirement of a "thorough"
system.48 The Sweetwater case held that the Wyoming constitution's
provision for equal taxation required equalization of educational opportunity. 49 The Van Dusartz court chose not to consider the Minnesota

constitution's requirement of a "general and uniform system," though it
suggested that the plaintiffs might have based their cause of action on
that provision also. 50 Thus, even if the United States Supreme Court
should reject the Serrano approach, these cases will remain viable.
III.

EDUCATION AS A FUNDAMENTAL INTEREST

The concept that interference with a "fundamental interest" requires
"stricter scrutiny" of challenged state action under the equal protection
clause than is required by the traditional "rational basis" test51 was pribe said to have acted affirmatively to discriminate . . . whenever its action raises
the cost of some social resource above what it would be in a private, unregulated
market, so that the poor's access to that resource is reduced significantly.
Id. at 1661-62 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
44. See, e.g., 5 Cal. 3d at 602-05, 487 P.2d at 1254-56, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 614-16.
45. Perhaps the instant cases did not accord this factor as much weight as it
deserved. They emphasized instead the cumulative effect of state involvement, a
more tenuous basis for finding "state action," but one which indicates that the
result would be the same even in the absence of compulsory school attendance laws.
46. See note 45 supra.
47. Cf. 5 Cal. 3d at 596 n.ll, 487 P.2d at 1249 n.ll, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 609 n.11.
The Serrano court impliedly found the California constitution internally inconsistent,
since the invalidated financing system was established by the constitution itself.
The Rodriguez and Spano cases also expressly involved the invalidation of
financing provisions of the state constitutions, as well as of state statutes. See 337
F. Supp. at 285; ----- N.Y.2d at -------N.E.2d at
. N.Y.S.2d at
48. 118 N.J. Super. at 268-69, 287 A.2d at 211.
49. 491 P.2d at 1236-37.
50. 334 F. Supp. at 874.
51. See Developments: Equal Protection, supra note 23, at 1127-32. The
"fundamental interest" analysis was borrowed from the due process doctrine, where
it had been used to amplify that concept in the fourteenth amendment. It became
unpopular when such due process was extended to include rights to employment and
other economic advantages. Continuing debates over these theories have occupied
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marily developed in voting reapportionment cases.12 Designation of interests as "fundamental" has occurred in other areas but the grounds
for such designation have been rather cryptically stated, so that the criteria
53
used to determine whether an interest is "fundamental" remain debatable.
Notably, education has been cited as "fundamental" only in cases where a
classification traditionally "suspect," that of race, has been involved. 54 In
Serrano, however, education was held to be "fundamental" in conjunction
with a classification by wealth, a classification not previously considered
"suspect" for purposes of invoking "strict scrutiny" independently of any
other classification or "fundamental interest."55
the Supreme Court. See Karst, Invidious Discrimination: Justice Douglas and the
Return of the "Natural-Law-Due-ProcessFormula," 16 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 716 (1969).
Similarly, debate continues as to whether due process would not be a more
appropriate framework in which to attack the problems considered by the school
finance cases. Compare Michelman, supra note 28, at 17, and Note, Discriminations
Against the Poor and the Fourteenth Amendment, 81 HARV. L. REv. 435, 438 (1967),
with Kurland, supra note 29, at 590-92.
52. The first case using the "fundamental interest" approach was Skinner v.
Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942), which recognized the
personal interest in procreation as too fundamental to permit a state to discriminate
between embezzlers and thieves in forcing sterilization of habitual offenders.
The reapportionment cases developed the approach in order to protect the
interest of citizen participation in the political process. Cf. City. of Phoenix v.
Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970); Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50
(1970); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) ; Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89
(1965) Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
53. Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 660-62 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). The right to equal treatment in criminal procedure, for instance, has been
presumed fundamental without any attempt to describe that quality. One commentator
has explained:
Probably every interest found to be fundamental and therefore protected by the
due process clause will also be fundamental under the equal protection clause,
so that unequal treatment with respect to that interest would be upheld only on
a very strong showing of justification. It does not appear, however, that every
interest deemed fundamental under the equal protection clause will be protected
by the due process clause. It may be, for example, that the due process clause does
not require that a state provide a criminal defendant with an appeal as of right,
whereas the equal protection clause does require that if the state provides an
appeal to some it cannot deny it to others ....
Developments: Equal Protection, supra note 23, at 1130 (citations omitted). Skinner
v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), held procreation sufficiently
fundamental to be protected by the equal protection clause, but Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965), held a similar interest to be protected on a different theory,
namely as within the "penumbras" of the Bill of Rights as incorporated into fourteenth
amendment due process. Also, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), recognized
a "fundamental interest" in mobility as preventing state-imposed waiting periods
for welfare benefits.
54. Cf. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967).
55. The Serrano court stated:
But plaintiffs' equal protection attack on the fiscal system has an additional
dimension. They assert that the system not only draws lines on the basis of wealth
but that it "touches upon," indeed has a direct and significant impact upon, a
"fundamental interest," namely education. It is urged that these two grounds,
particularly in combination, establish a demonstrable denial of equal protection
of the laws.
5 Cal. 3d at 604, 487 P.2d at 1255, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 615. The court admitted that
there was no direct authority for education as a "fundamental interest" for these
purposes. Id. It discussed Hargrave v. McKinney, 413 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1969),
on remand sub norn., Hargrave v. Kirk, 313 F. Supp. 944 (M.D. Fla. 1970), vacated
and remanded sub nom. Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476 (1971). The Fifth Circuit
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The commentators have suggested four possible criteria which may
determine "fundamental" status, and by which the Serrano court's conclusion can be examined: (1) the interest is basic to the operation of our
political system and therefore preservative of all important rights ;56 (2)
the interest is integral to the identity of the individual and recognized
implicitly by the ninth amendment ;57 (3) the interest is personal to a group
unable to vindicate its rights without judicial protection; 58 or (4) the
interest, out of fairness, nmust be protected because of the "severity of the
detriment" when the interest is frustrated, a criterion closely ana!ogous
to the traditional fifth amendment due process analysis. 59 The Serrano
court justified the uniqueness of education on all but the third criteria:60
as the state's main way to socialize its citizens, as the chief influence
outside the family in developing the psyche, 61 and as the only way the
held that a cause of action had been stated, on grounds that a ceiling on tax rates
for support of education denied equal protection. The three-judge district court, on
remand, held that the traditional test of rationality could not be met by the system,
and it granted summary judgment. The Supreme Court held summary judgment
was improper and that the state's interests had to be fully explored. The weight
of this case is thus somewhat less than the Serrano court suggested. See 5 Cal. 3d at
604 n.22, 487 P.2d at 1255 n.22, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 615 n.22. For a discussion of
wealth classifications in the area of criminal procedure, see text accompanying notes
103-60 infra.
56. The franchise is "preservative of other basic civil and political rights."
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964). Cf. Developments: Equal Protection,
supra note 23, at 1127-32.
57. Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Skinner v. Oklahoma
ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). With reference to the proposition that
social as well as physical mobility is the underlying rationale for all equal protection
attacks on state interference, see Ratner, Inter-Neighborhood Denials of Equal
Protection in the Provision of Municipal Services, 4 HARV. Civ. RIGITs-CIv. LIB.
L. REV. 1, 24-25 (1968).
58. See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 628 (1969):
The presumption of constitutionality . . . [is] based on an assumption that the
institutions of state government are structured so as to represent fairly all the
people. However, when the challenge to the statute is in effect a challenge of
this basic assumption, the assumption can no longer serve ....
See also United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)
Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. REv. 193, 202-03
(1952).
59. See Michelman, supra note 28, at 14-16; Developments: Equal Protection,
supra note 23, at 1130-31. See also note 51 supra. This criterion might be measured
in absolute or relative terms. Michelman appears to use an absolute measure, while
the test proposed in this Comment is more towards a relative measure. See text
acompanying notes 172-79 infra.
60. It could be argued, with reference to the third criterion, that children are
a special minority whose interests in their future cannot be politically protected at
the polls. See 118 N.J. Super. at 279, 287 A.2d at 216; Coons, Clune & Sugarman,
Educational Opoprtunity: A
Vorkable Constitutional Test for State Financial
Structures, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 305, 389-90 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Coons, Clune
& Sugarman]. But cf. YMCA v. Kugler, ---- F. Supp.
(D.N.J. 1972).
61. Judge Sullivan in Serrano distinguished other municipal services on the
basis that they were "essentially neutral in their effect on the individual psyche."
5 Cal. 3d at 610, 487 P.2d at 1259, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 619, citing Coons, Clune &
Sugarman, supra note 60, at 389. But see Comment, Potholes, Lampposts and
Policemen: Equal Protection and the Financing of Basic Municipal Services in the
Wake of Hawkins and Serrano, 17 VILL. L. REv. 655, 672 nn.88-89, where the
author stated that police and fire protection could have such an effect in a negative
sense if they were denied.
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poor and disadvantaged can escape their handicaps and compete on an
62
equal basis.
An examination of interests which have previously been considered
"fundamental" reveals that voting might be included by the first and third
criteria,6 3 freedom from criminal punishment by the fourth criterion,64
and such interests as procreation and freedom to travel by the second
criterion. 5 Because education meets all of these criteria, 66 it might easily
be classed as a "fundamental interest," but at the same time, by enlarging
the application of each possible criterion, recognition of its "fundamental"
status naturally increases the effective scope of the equal protection clause.
For example, street lighting 67 might arguably be "fundamental" by either
the first or second criterion. Thus, a state might be severely limited in
its choice of methods for municipal improvement.6 "
To limit the potentially pervasive effects, it has been suggested that
the fourth criterion should be controlling ;69 that is, once a basic minimum
of equality has been provided, inequalities will be permissible for budgetary, 70 experimental, 71 or other reasons. This criterion, arguably, may
explain all the traditional "fundamental interests." 72 For instance, the
detriment from denial of the vote is an absolute exclusion from the political
process, though it may not affect the personal life of a given individual
significantly.75
Restriction

Criminal process involves deprivation of personal liberty.
aspect of one's economic life

of travel would affect every

as well as basic liberty.7 4

Finally, restriction of procreation involves a

62. 5 Cal. 3d at 608-10, 487 P.2d at 1258-59, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 618-19.
63. See notes 56 & 59 supra.
64. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
65. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Skinner v. Oklahoma
ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
66. The Serrano court made analogies between education and other accepted
"fundamental interests." For fuller discussion of the limitations of such comparisons,
see Coons, Clune & Sugarman, supra note 60, at 355-69; Kurland, supra note 29,
at 584-89. The latter contains a careful analysis of the precedents for a Serranotype decision and a skeptical view of the advisability of structuring them to reach
the Serrano result.
67. Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), held that services
such as street paving, street lighting, sewage and others, could not be distributed on
an unequal basis, according to race. See Comment, supra note 61. See also text
accompanying notes 223-24 infra.
68. See Ratner, supra note 57, at 47-48, where the author indicated that a wide
margin would be left for experimentation and piecemeal improvement.
69. See Michelman, supra note 28, at 32-46. Professor Michelman would substitute equal "minimum protection" for equal protection. Cf. note 59 supra.
70. State fiscal economy is seldom considered a "compelling state interest" in
equal protection analysis. Cf. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970) ; Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) ; Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
71. Cf. People v. Chain, 22 Cal. App. 3d 493, 99 Cal. Rptr. 472 (Ct. App. 1971)
(a classification inherent in a temporary, experimental jury retention procedure did not
violate equal protection).
72. This criterion is identified as a common thread in Developments: Equal
Protection, supra note 23, at 1130.
73. Denial of the vote, like denial of criminal justice, is arguably less likely
to affect large numbers of people in their personal lives than an interest like
education.
74. For a discussion of the proposition that mobility is to be protected under
"equal protection," see notes 43 & 57 supra and 179 infra.
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serious detriment to the life of a family. 75 This criterion would include
as well, however, such basic guarantees of safety as police and fire
protection, while, as noted above, excluding other public services, in77
70
dividually less vital, such as street lighting or certain welfare benefits.
This fourth criterion, the severity of the detriment measured by a
standard of fairness, highlights the major difficulty with designating education and other interests as "fundamental." If the interest is so basic that
no unequal treatment can exist with reference to it unless "compelled"
by the state interest, 78 what are the limits of the interest and how are they
to be measured ?79 It may be noted that previously recognized "fundamental
interests" have been of an absolute, almost imponderable, nature and have
been treated by the courts much in that way.80 The interest in education,
however, is seemingly not so imponderable. While education has undoubted
value, 8' its value is not absolute, as it involves many varying degrees
8
of deprivation and affects different individuals in very different ways. 2
The problem of defining its limits goes to the very heart of the judicial
development of any constitutional doctrine and characterizes the major
distinction between the approaches of the Serrano and Spano courts to
Supreme Court's summary affirmance of Mclnnis v. Ogilvie 8 and Burruss
v. Wilkerson.8 4 These latter cases held that children, parents and taxpayers
had not stated causes of action by alleging that equal protection was denied
75. This aspect of the doctrine may have special impact on attempts at population
control and at prohibition of such control. Cf. YMCA v. Kugler,
F. Supp. __

(D.N.J.) (1972), holding that in view of a woman's right to privacy, the state
had no "compelling state interest" to support a statute prohibiting all abortions
performed "without legal justification."
76. But see note 67 supra.
77. See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
78. For a discussion of the enormous burden of showing a "compelling state
interest," see notes 161-71 and accompanying text infra.
79. Cf. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), wherein the diversity of opinions
by the different justices might be viewed as stemming from disagreement on what
was the actual substance of the admittedly "fundamental" right to vote.
80. See Developments: Equal Protection, supra note 23, at 1127-30, wherein the
author indicated that the courts have used an ad hoc approach. See also Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
81. The Serrano court cited numerous authorities. 5 Cal. 3d at 604-09, 487 P.2d
at 1255-58, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 615-18.
82. The 1966 Coleman Report, a federal study of education, found education
to be of "minimal impact when compared with the influence of family and social
background." Wall Street Journal, Mar. 2, 1972, at 1, col. 6.
83. 394 U.S. 322 (1969), aff'g mem. sub norn. McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp.
327 (N.D. Ill. 1968). On facts similar to Serrano, the three-judge district court
held that the fourteenth amendment does not require "that public school expenditures
be made only on the basis of pupils' educational needs," noting that the plaintiff
students never "offer[ed] a definition of this nebulous concept," and that the
controversy was nonjusticiable for lack of "judicially manageable standards." 293
F. Supp. at 336, 335.
84. 397 U.S. 44 (1970), aff'g mem., 310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969). The
facts were similar to Mclnnis. The three-judge district court stated:
[Tihe courts have neither the knowledge, nor the means, nor the power to
tailor the public moneys to fit the varying needs of these students throughout
the State. We can only see to it that the outlays on one group are not invidiously
greater or less than that of another. No such arbitrariness is manifest here.
310 F. Supp. at 574.
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because their children were not being educated according to their needs.
The Spano court concluded that the factual similarity underlying the instant cases and that of Mclnnis and Burruss required that the latter govern
any equal protection claim on such facts.88 However, the duty of lower
courts to examine the facts of each case in the light of the law must leave
room for development of bridges between existing doctrines and new
fact situations. 6 The Spano court overlooked the argument, made by
the Serrano court,87 that Mclnnis and Burruss failed to present any
judicially workable standard for measuring the interest in education because they sought a mandate that states meet each child's particulareducational needs.88 The Serrano court noted that the factual and legal emphasis
on individual need, as opposed to an impermissible pattern of variance
from the average educational offering in Serrano,89 could have been
decisive in preventing the Supreme Court from imprinting this new
fact situation with a definitive constitutional interpretation."
A conceptual distinction, on the basis of input and output, is particularly valuable here. 91 The Mclnnis and Burruss arguments may be
characterized as an attempt to measure the educational interest by the
quality of the "output" 92 - that is, that all children derive equal benefit
85 -......
N.Y.2d at ...,

N.E.2d at -...----.N.Y.S.2d at -------

86. Cf. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20-26 (1956)

(Frankfurter, J., con-

curring).
87. 5 Cal. 3d at 615-17, 487 P.2d at 1263-64, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 623-25.
88. The Serrano court noted that such treatment does not foreclose future
close examination in other courts of the same issue, especially when the issue is so
important and when the elements are better defined than in any earlier case. Id.
Compare Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), with Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549
(1946). The Serrano court cited Frankfurter & Landis, The Business of the Supreme
Court at October Term, 1929, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1, 14 (1930).
89. The court summarized:
For the reasons we have explained in detail, this system conditions the full
entitlement to [education] on wealth, classifies its recipients on the basis of their
collective affluence and makes the quality of a child's education depend upon the
resources of his school district and ultimately upon the pocketbook of his
parents ....
[T]he public school financing system denies them equal protection
of the laws because it produces substantial disparities among school districts in
the amount of revenue available for education.
5 Cal. 3d at 614, 618, 487 P.2d at 1263, 1265, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 623, 625.
90. One can only speculate as to the reason for the Court's summary treatment
of McInnis and Burruss. The Spano court emphasized the care with which these
cases were argued. However, the Serrano court quoted one of the most prominent
commentators involved, stating:
The meaning of McInnis v. Shapiro is ambiguous; but the case hardly seems
another Plessy v. Ferguson. Probably but a temporary setback, it was the

predictable consequence of an effort to force the Court to precipitous and decisive

action upon a novel and complex issue for which neither it nor the parties were
ready .... [T]he plaintiffs' virtual absence of intelligible theory left the district
court bewildered. . . . It is probably . . . an admonition to the protagonists
to clarify the options before again invoking the Court's aid.
Coons, Clune & Sugarman, supra note 60, at 308-09, quoted in 5 Cal. 3d at 617 n.37,
487 P.2d at 1265 n.37, 96 Cal. Rptr. 625 n.37.
91. Cf. Developments: Equal Protection, supra note 23, at 1159-69.
92. See Comment, supra note 61, at 662-63 & n.36.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1972

11

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 5 [1972], Art. 4
MAY

1972]

COMMENTS

from their educations - instead of by the quality of the "input" 93 - that is,
94
that the same resources be expended on each child's education. Not only
did the Serrano, Van Dusartz, Rodriguez, and Robinson courts not demand equal output, 95 only referring to it to show that meager input was
strongly correlated with poor output,9" but they declined to examine
particular facets of educational input, except for the purpose of showing
a consistent pattern of classification, 97 not for the purpose of proscribing
isolated aberrations.9" The emphasis in every case was on equal availability of funds for general, quality education. 99 In emphasizing that it
was not requiring the state to dispense education according to need, the
Van Dusartz court stated:
Plainly put, the rule is that the level of spending for a child's education
may not be a function of wealth other than wealth of the state as a
whole.1 00
The interest was there described as the right "to have the level of spending
for [children's] education unaffected by variations in the taxable wealth
of their school district or their parent's." 10 1 Thus, while these cases desig93. Id. at 662 & n.33.
94. This distinction should be useful in analyzing and measuring other interests,
such as welfare and public services. Cf. note 191 infra.
95. See note 97 and accompanying text infra.
96. The Robinson court undertook particularly careful analysis of input and
output data to establish that improved input, even measured only as per pupil
expenditure, was correlated with quality output. 118 N.J. Super. at 235-65, 287 A.2d
at 193-209.
97. The Van Dusartz court stated:
The State makes the argument that what plaintiffs seek here is uniformity, of
expenditure for each pupil in Minnesota. Neither this case nor Serrano requires
absolute uniformity of school expenditures.
334 F. Supp. at 876.
The Rodriguez court stated that the system's defect was that it "makes
education a function of the local property tax base." 337 F. Supp. at 282. The court
further stated:
In the instant case plaintiffs have not advocated that educational expenditures
be equal for each child. Rather, they have recommended the application of the
principle of "fiscal neutrality." Briefly summarized, this standard requires that
the quality of public education may not be a function of wealth, other than the
wealth of the state as a whole.
Id. at 283-84. Cf. note 226 infra.
98. Cf. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967). The district court
in Hobson did order a specific factor to be changed - assignment of teachers. Id.
at 516.
99. The Robinson case is particularly interesting in this respect, since the
system was invalidated in the face of an already adopted legislative program which,
if fully funded, might have been adequate. 118 N.J. Super. at 270, 287 A.2d at 211.
Judge Botter noted evidence of the strong correlation between input and output.
He further stated:
[O]ne facet of the case at hand does invite a simple standard. Since the State
Constitution requires the State Legislature to provide a thorough education for
all pupils age 5 to 18, a tax levied to raise revenues for that specific State
purpose should be applied uniformly to all members of the same class of
taxpayers.
Id. at 276-77, 287 A.2d at 215.
100. 334 F. Supp. at 872 (emphasis added).
101. Id.
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nated education as a "fundamental interest" for purposes of equal protection, therefore invoking "strict scrutiny" whenever inequalities exist with
reference to it, they limited their holdings to the invalidity of dispensing
10 2
education according to classifications by wealth.
IV.

CLASSIFICATION BY WEALTH

The designation of wealth classifications as "suspect," therefore requiring "strict scrutiny," has been derived principally from cases in the
criminal procedure area, 103 such as Griffin v. Illinois, 10 4 which held that
the right to appeal a conviction could not be conditioned on payment
of a fee for a transcript. This case, for example, was relied on by the
Serrano court.10 5 The wealth classifications in Griffin and other similar
criminal cases, however, have always been accompanied by the "fundamental interest" in freedom from illegal punishment and in access to
legal vindication. 10 6 The analogy to these cases serves to identify the
"egalitarian interest" which the judiciary has taken upon itself to protect ;107
that is, while confinement had formerly been a legitimate alternative to
payment of fines, the courts have held that it is no longer such, for it is
a burden on the poor and is based solely upon financial status.' 08 Since it
has been increasingly recognized that the realities of modern society forced
upon certain persons, through no fault of their own, the disadvantages of
poverty, 10 9 the poor may be increasingly favored with judicial protection.
Beyond this, the analogy to the criminal cases seems forced. 110 In
the first place, the courts are in a special position to gauge unfair discriminations in the judicial system, while education has been traditionally
102. See note 115 infra.
103. See Developments: Equal Protection, supra note 23, at 1124. See also Tate
v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971)
(forbidding imprisonment of indigents for nonpayment of a fine when punishment for the crime was limited to fines); Williams
v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970) (forbidding such imprisonment beyond the statutory
maximum for the crime); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (forbidding
procedures whereby a court had discretion whether to appoint counsel for an
indigent's appeal) ; Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (forbidding the requirement
of a fee for a transcript when a transcript was necessary for appeal).
104. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
105. In order to refute the state's argument that only purposeful discrimination
is unlawful, the Serrano court, citing Griffin, went so far as to state that "several
cases have held that where important rights are at stake, the state has an affirmative
obligation to relieve an indigent of the burden of his own poverty by supplying
without charge certain goods or services for which others must pay." 5 Cal. 3d at
602, 487 P.2d at 1253, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 613. This seems to be an oversimplified reading
of Griffin.
106. See Developments: Equal Protection, supra note 23, at 1124.
107. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 680 (1966) (Harlan
& Stewart, JJ., dissenting); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 358-64 (1963)
(Clark, Harlan & Stewart, JJ., dissenting). In Douglas, Justice Clark accused the
Court of having a "fetish for indigency." Id. at 359.
108. See Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971).
109. See generally M. HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA (Penguin ed. 1962).
110. See Kurland, supra note 29, at 584-87.
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a purely legislative function."' Secondly, an individual's payment of a
fee, on the rationale that he is paying the costs of asserting a personal
legal right, is far removed conceptually from the payment of property taxes
for the general support of an educational system, regardless of whether2
and to what extent the taxpayer uses the service being paid for."
Thirdly, services needed by a criminal defendant are offered specifically
to protect him from the state's prosecution, which is presumably to his
detriment, while educational services are themselves the only state action
13
to which the individual is being subjected and are presumably a benefit.
Finally, the relevant wealth in the instant cases is not simply that of
the individual or even that of his family, since the wealth of a district
114
often depends on the placement of industry, not of its inhabitants.
The case most often relied upon for the proposition that wealth
classifications are "suspect" outside the criminal law area and which was
cited in the instant cases' 1 5 is Harper v. Virginia Board of

111. See generally Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).

lec-

Justice Black stated

for the Court:

Both equal protection and due process emphasize the central aim of our entire

judicial system - all people charged with crime must . . . "stand on a equality
before the bar ......
Id. at 16-18. Compare Griffin with Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663, 670 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting).
112. See Shanks, Book Review, 84 HARV. L. REV. 256, 261 (1970). Cf. Harper
v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 680 (1966) (dissenting opinion). But see
Michelman, supra note 28, at 49-50, where the author indicated that these two types
of preconditions are essentially alike.
113. This distinction involves the question not explored in this Comment of
generally beneficial versus wholly remedial state undertakings. The distinction may
be a factor in determining whether there has been "state action."
114. In Serrano, the state argued that the discrimination had to be based on
personal or family wealth to be invidious. The court answered that there was a correlation between family and district wealth, but that, in addition, "fortuitous presence"
of any kind of property in a district was a suspect basis on which to apportion
education. 5 Cal. 3d at 600-01, 487 P.2d at 1252-53, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 612-13. Industry
may play a large part in determining the wealth of a district. A representative of
the Suburban Action Institute claimed that "existing school finances give communities
little choice but to pursue [industry] in order to obtain tax money." Wall Street
Journal, Mar. 13, 1972, at 1, col. 6. See note 242 infra.
115. The Rodriguez case cited language from McDonald v. Board of Election
Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969), in support of classification by wealth as independently requiring "strict scrutiny," but that case found no classification by wealth
and used only a "rational basis" test, even though an interest related to voting was
involved - use of absentee ballots.
In contrast, the Van Dusartz case, citing Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections,
383 U.S. 663 (1966), and Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), stated:
This does not suggest that by itself discrimination by wealth is necessarily
decisive. No court has so held. However, when the wealth classification affects
the distribution of public education, the constitutional significance is cumulative.
334 F. Supp. at 876 (footnotes omitted). Notably, the court distinguished Dandridge
as lacking a suspect classification.
The Robinson case did not put independent reliance on the "suspectness"
of the wealth classification, and Spano used Serrano as blanket authority. The Serrano
court stated:
It is urged that these two grounds [lines drawn on the basis of wealth and
impact on education], particularly in combination, establish a demonstrable denial
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tions," 6 wherein a poll tax was struck down on the alternative grounds of
racial and wealth discrimination. Notably, however, the traditional "fundamental interest" in voting was also present. Only Hobson v. Hansen" 7 has
suggested that wealth classifications, coupled with education, were "suspect," but again, racial discrimination was a major influence in that
decision," 8 and the appellate courts chose not to rely on the wealth
classification rationale in affirming the lower court's decision.
Because of the complexities involved in such analogies to criminal
law and voting rights cases, it seems that an analysis of the reasons
offered for the "suspect" status of other classifications would best serve
as a framework in which to examine wealth classifications in the new
area of education in the instant cases.
The commentary suggests several reasons for particular classifications
being designated "suspect." These include (1) a political disadvantage
of the class,"" (2) an inability to divorce oneself from the class,120 (3) a
21
possible stigma implied by distinctions based on the class characteristic,'
and (4) a particular responsibility of society for the initial burden of the
class characteristic. 22 Classifications previously deemed "suspect" might
have been so for these reasons, but as noted with reference to designating
interests "fundamental,"' 2 3 the courts seldom attempt a detailed explanation. Race classifications, the original concern of the fourteenth
amendment ,124 might be designated "suspect" for the first, second, and
of equal protection of the laws. To this phase of the argument we now turn
our attention.
Until the present time wealth classifications have been invalidated only in
conjunction with a limited number of fundamental interests - rights of defendants in criminal cases ... and voting rights ....

5 Cal. 3d at 604, 487 P.2d at 1255, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 615. The court fails to make clear
whether the effects are independent or cumulative.
See Michelman, supra note 28, at 27-28, where, in 1969, the author stated:
Yet it remains true that in no decision of the Court has any such doctrine [de
facto wealth classification as suspect] been needed.

116. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
117. 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967). See notes 29 & 96 supra.
118. Id. The Serrano court only briefly noted the possibility of racial discrimination in the underlying facts of that case. 5 Cal. 3d at 590 n.1, 609 n.27, 487 P.2d at
1244-45 n.1, 1259 n.27, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 604 n.1, 619 n.27.
119. Cf. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969) ; Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) ; Karst, supra note 51, at 742; Rostow,
supra note 58, at 202.
120. See Developments: Equal Protection, supra note 23, at 1126-27, suggesting
that alienage and poverty might be distinguished from race, sex and illegitimacy on
this point. See Michelman, supra note 28, at 33, suggesting that a suspect classification
is one based on characteristics which the individual is "powerless to change currently
and which is not the result of any decision freely made by him in the proximate
past."
121. See Developments: Equal Protection, supra note 23, at 1126-27.
122. Id. at 8-9. The author suggested the courts' role could best be analyzed as
"vindication of a state's duty to protect against certain hazards which are endemic
in an unequal society, rather than as vindication of a duty to avoid complicity in
unequal treatment." Id. (emphasis in original).
123. See note 53 and acompanying text supra.
124. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1872).
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third reasons. 12 5 Historically, classification by national origin has been
included as "suspect" for the second and third reasons, 126 and also the
first when aliens were involved. 127 Classifications distinguishing between
sexes or legitimate and illegitimate children may be "suspect" for the
second and third reasons.12 Classification based on wealth might be
"suspect" for all four reasons. However, if justification for the designation
of wealth classification as "suspect" were limited solely to the first reason
(political disadvantage), the concept becomes very difficult to limit since,
once it is admitted that a group may be politically disadvantaged even
though every member may vote, protection might be sought by any group
which by its nature has little political power. 29 This would be reminiscent
of the early excesses of economic due process, ° when judicial authority
1 31
was used to vindicate "rights" sacrificed by the majority-rule system.
If the second reason is used to support the "suspect" status of wealth
classifications, one of the principle "floodgates"' 132 of such status - the
danger that every difference in the quality of life which varies according to
wealth might require "strict scrutiny"' 33 - might be controlled.13 4 This
would be accomplished by recognition in a given case that the difference
complained of was not dependent on the inescapable aspects of poverty. 3 5
For example, variations in economic advantage between small and large
merchants would not be strictly scrutinized. 136 This reason is not adequate
alone, however, because it fails to provide a means to distinguish between beneficial and detrimental classifications, arguably making it "sus125. Cf. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

126. See Korematsu v.United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) ; Yick Wo v.Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356 (1886).
127. See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (child of alien, ineligible
for citizenship, forbidden to hold property).
128. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Glona v. American Guar. &
Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968) ; Commonwealth v. Daniels, 430 Pa. 642, 243 A.2d
400 (1968).
129. Compare the majority opinion in Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 63 (1968),
with the dissent in the same case. But see Karst, supra note 51, at 742.
130. See note 51 supra. See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 661 (1969)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) ; Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670
(1966) (Black, J., dissenting).
131. The concept of alleviating the effects of a majority rule has also played
a part in equal protection analysis. See notes 140-48 and accompanying text infra.
132. The Spano court stated that the preliminary judgment as to the sufficiency
of the complaint in the Serrano case was "a tenuous reed upon which to sustain the
instant complaint and thereby further open the floodgates." .__ N.Y.2d at .. , -_
N.E.2d at ---- ---N.Y.S.2d at ..
133. Cf. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 361-62 (1963), wherein Justice
Harlan, dissenting, noted that "every financial exaction" burdens indigents more
than those economically well-situated.
134. Compare Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971) (closing of swimming
pool allowed), with Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (closing of
county schools disallowed).
135. See Developments: Equal Protection, supra note 23, at 1126-27. The
author stated that this reason "may explain why classifications based on alienage a legal status generally subject to change - and on poverty have received more
lenient treatment than those based on race." Id. at 1127.
136. Id. For a discussion of the disfavor generated by "economic" due process,
see note 51 supra.
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pect" for a state to pass legislation to help, for example, the blind or
137
the poor.

The third reason would serve to make the distinction between benefit
and detriment, but seems too broad by itself to be an adequate reason
for "suspect" status. Even if used in conjunction with the second reason,
it would not, it is suggested, offer a valid basis on which courts could
analyze wealth distinctions with consistent results. Though the stigma
13 8
of poverty has been recognized as an extra burden on the poor,
it would seem to require some means by which a court could measure
13 9
group prejudice, a task courts have heretofore avoided.
Thoughtful commentators have explained that the fourth reason
the duty of a majoritarian society - is the one to be emphasized, particularly in the case of wealth distinctions. 140 They urge that equal protection be used to insulate minorities against the harshest manifestations
of majority rule. Since our economy of abundance has failed to provide
for the minimal needs of all its members, governmental action which unnecessarily increases these burdens should be prohibited.1 4'. Wealth fits
u42
this analysis better than do any of the traditional "suspect classifications,'
except perhaps illegitimacy, 1 43 since differences in wealth are peculiarly
the product of our system of resource allocation and benefit distribution
based on wealth inequality and incentives. 144 Designation of a classification
137. See Developments: Equal Protection, supra note 23, at 1123-24 (discussion
of "benign classifications.")
138. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954), for the proposition
that separate schools are inherently unequal:
The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law; for the policy of
separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the
Negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn.
139. Id.
140. See Ratner, supra note 57, at 19-22; Michelman, supra note 28. Articulating
his doctrine, Professor Michelman stated:
It is no justification for deprivation of a fundamental right (i.e., involuntary
nonfulfillment of a just want) that the deprivation results from a general
practice of requiring persons to pay for what they get.
Id. at 32. The author distinguished McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969), as the
rejection of a total equalization, in contrast to his proposal of an equal minimum.
The Serrano court, and the Van Dusartz, Rodriguez, and Robinson courts, chose
instead to take the approach suggested by Professor Coons. Coons, Clune & Sugarman,
supra note 60, at 366-67, 410-13. These courts distinguished McInnis as the rejection
of needs, in contrast to equality, as the standard for measuring equal protection. They
have left the emphasis, then, on relative inequality rather than shifting it to the
power to reach a minimum average. The remedy will be the same, however, in this
situation.
141. See Michelman, supra note 28, at 8-15.
142. It could be argued that majority prejudice, rather than race itself, is the
operative characteristic in classifications by race, so that race also could fit this
criterion.
143. Illegitimacy may be a product of societal life, since the formality of the
parents' marriage is not an innate characteristic of a child.
144. Cf. Michelman, supra note 28, at 14-15. The author stated:
The total effect [of emphasis on invidious classification] is to treat the pricing
practice, rather than nonsatisfaction of a particular want, as chiefly constituting
the evil to be curbed. What results finally is a palpable, if vague, impression that
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as "suspect" for this reason permits a line to be drawn between benefits
and detriments, by distinguishing between burdens on a minority for the
sake of the majority (such as poor schools in poor counties so that a
majority of counties may have local control - the situation in the instant
cases) and burdens on the majority to help a minority (such as higher
general taxes to support headstart programs) .145 At the same time, however, it lends itself to the proposition that burdens on the majority for
the minority's benefit are required. Thus, in the instant cases, compensatory programs for those unable to take full advantage of their equal
educational opportunity might be required. This would, it will be noted,
be equivalent to demanding some equalization of "output,"' 46 a requirement which the instant cases carefully avoided. 147 The majoritarian society
reason for finding a classification "suspect" as presented by Professor
Michelman, its main proponent, 1 48 would allow the imposition of the requirement within a specific limit. This limit is described as the fulfillment of
certain "just wants" which a reasonable man would consider not capable
of being sacrificed for the sake of majority rule. Judicial application of
the Michelman approach would seem to involve a departure from current
judicial analysis, both by ignoring the "state action" limitation on equal
protection in order to make positive requirements on states, and by requiring judicial inquiry as to what are the basic needs, or "just wants," in our
society 149 - an inquiry which seems to have been previously discarded
in the context of substantive due process.' 5 The Michelman approach,
therefore, would involve a valuable shift of emphasis from the relationship
between types of classifications and state interests affecting "fundamental
interests" to the relationship between types of classifications and individual
expectations with respect to "fundamental interests." 1' 1 It is submitted
that this shift of emphasis may be achieved by the "modified strict scrutiny"
test proposed below, 152 without such departures from the judicial practice

under the doctrine of "strict scrutiny."
It should be noted from the foregoing analysis that, while courts
have described "strict scrutiny" as appropriate where either a "fundamental
the ledger of occasions when the Court will intervene against a pricing practice
is not only pregnant but fecund ....
Id. at 31. (citations omitted). Cf. Ratner, supra note 57, at 34 ("The chief object of
providing free public education must include the intent to remove education from
the competitive marketplace").
145. Cf. Developments: Equal Protection,supra note 23, at 1188-89.
146. See notes 91-99 and accompanying text supra.
147. See note 115 supra.
148. See Michelman, supra note 28, at 30-50.
149. Id.
150. Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 655 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
note 51 supra.
151. Cf. note 59 supra. The approach does not actually examine the last relationship. It weighs the rationality of the deprivation relative to the "just wants"
of all individuals rather than relative to a legislatively chosen classification.
152. See text accompanying notes 172-79 infra.
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interest" or a "suspect classification" is present 1 53 judicial behavior indicates a delicate relationship between the two. As has been seen, reasons
for designating an interest as "fundamental" cannot be analyzed without
reference to the types of distinction being made by a challenged classification, nor can reasons for designating a classification "suspect" be analyzed in
isolation from the interests being affected. Though the Serrano opinion 54
suggested that the interest in education and classification by wealth independently commanded "strict scrutiny," the Van Dusartz opinion, professing complete agreement with Serrano, distinguished the case of Dandridge v. Williams'5 5 as one in which an arguably "fundamental interest"
was not being affected by a "suspect classification."'5 6 Although cases
holding that the equal protection clause is purely personal, and that it
applies to classifications no matter how narrow, might suggest otherwise, 157
it is suggested that inequality existing independent of any pattern from
which a "suspect classification" might be implied would be permissible. 58
Thus a gap in this area of equal protection seems to be the lack of a
theory to explain the effects of the combination of a "fundamental interest"
and a "suspect classification." The instant cases were careful to limit
their holdings to condemnation of the functional relationship between a
district's wealth and the qualitative input into the district's educational
system. 1' 9 The Serrano court, on whose analysis the other courts relied,
reached this holding after separate examinations of education and wealth
according to the "strict scrutiny" doctrine. Serrano offered no conceptual
analysis of why only their combination was to be condemned, but only
pleaded that the case be limited to its facts. 160 Thus, while the Serrano
court carefully applied "strict scrutiny," its reasoning left a gap which
was not filled by the last step of "strict scrutiny," the search for a
"compelling state interest" which necessitated the financing system.
V.

JUSTIFICATION

BY

A

COMPELLING

STATE

INTEREST

It is notable that Serrano, Van Dusartz, Rodriguez, and Robinson
rejected, for lack of a "rational basis" rather than under "strict scrutiny,"
the respective states' arguments that the Serrano result would mean sacrificing the states' intent to have local decision-making determine the choice
153. See note 115 supra.
154. Id.
155. 397 U.S. 471 (1970). For a discussion of other aspects of Dandridge, see
notes 34 & 36 supra & 190 infra.
156. Id.
157. See, e.g., McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 235 U.S. 151 (1914), discussed
in Horowitz, Unseparate but Unequal - The Emerging Fourteenth Amendment
Issue in Public School Education, 13 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1147, 1159-61 (1966).
158. Cf., e.g., Briggs v. Kerrigan, 431 F.2d 967 (ist Cir. 1970), wherein the
court was not convinced that a pattern had been demonstrated, nor that the detriment
was severe. See note 33 supra.
159. See notes 115 supra & 161 infra.
160. See, e.g., note 165 and accompanying text infra.
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of local government priorities. 6" The courts noted that there was, in
effect, no causal relationship between a locality's willingness to tax itself
for education and the amount of investment in its children's education.
This point was decisive in Rodriguez, where the court found that the
state did not offer any other justification. 162 It also appears to have been
decisive in Sweetimater, where it was clear that the decision by Sweetwater
County to join Bairoil School District into its unified district was based
on its being "naturally eager" to encompass a district with the "highest
valuation per student" in the state, with no consideration having been given
1 63
to the "education, convenience and welfare of the children.
Examination of the states' "compelling interest" was necessary in the
instant cases because of their argument that local control of and responsibility for education were important state purposes. The Serrano court, however, declined to decide if these were "compelling," choosing instead to note
that they did not, in any case, require the challenged discrimination for
their accomplishment. Significantly, the court offered no details as to
alternative means, saying only that, "[n]o matter how the state decides
to finance its system of public education, it can still leave this decisionmaking power in the hands of local districts. 1 64 Similarly, the Van
Dusartz court merely stated that "it is the singular virtue of the Serrano
principle that the State remains free to pursue all imaginable interests
except that of distributing education according to wealth.' 65 The Robinson
court alone explicitly decided that the state actually had no "compelling justification for making a taxpayer in one district pay a tax at a higher rate
than a taxpayer in another district, so long as the revenue serves the common State educational purpose. 1 6 However, even this court failed to offer
any detailed alternatives to the system which it struck down. 167 Only
the Sweetwater case proposed concrete alternatives. 6 8 As in the racial
161.

The Serrano court stated:

We need not decide whether such decentralized financial decision-making
is a compelling state interest, since under the present financing system, such
fiscal freewill is a cruel illusion for the poor school districts.
5 Cal. 3d at 611, 487 P.2d at 1260, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 620. The Van Dusartz court
stated :
By its own acts, the State has indicated it is not primarily interested in local
choice in school matters. In fact, rather than reposing in each school district the
economic power to fix its own level of per pupil expenditure, the State has so
arranged the structure as to guarantee that some districts will spend low (with
high taxes) while others will spend high (with low taxes).
334 F. Supp. at 876. For the holding in Rodriguez, see note 166 infra. For Robinson's
conclusion, see 118 N.J. Super. at 275, 287 A.2d at 214.
162. Cf. 337 F. Supp. at 284.
163. 491 P.2d at 1235-36.
164. 5 Cal. 3d at 610, 487 P.2d at 1260, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 620.
165. 334 F. Supp. at 876.
166. 118 N.J. Super. at 278, 287 A.2d at 216. The Rodriquez case stated:
Not only are defendants unable to demonstrate compelling state interests for
their classifications based upon wealth, they fail even to establish a reasonable
basis for these classifications.
337 F. Supp. at 284.
167. See notes 180-91 and accompanying text infra.
168. The Sweetwater case suggested that local initiative for expenditures for
other than capital improvements up to 10-15 per cent of the state-guaranteed minimum
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desegregation cases' 69 and the reapportionment cases, 170 the other courts
merely recognized that better methods could be found and therefore left
it up to the legislatures to find an acceptable plan. They tried to fulfill
their role of protecting constitutional guarantees in a complex and sensitive
area, without passing judgment on the aims of the elected branch and
without engaging in the legislative process of detailed investigation of
7
the means.' '

VI.

A

MODIFIED STRICT SCRUTINY TEST

The courts in the instant cases adhered to the theory that the judicial
refinements engaged in for the designation of "fundamental interests"
and "suspect classifications" are merely preliminary steps to determine
whether a state must show merely a rationally related interest under the
"rational basis test," or a "compelling interest" under the "strict
scrutiny
test."'1 72 It is submitted that the theory of "strict scrutiny" should be
modified in such a way as to put less emphasis on the last step, the
examination of the state's "compelling interest," which is handled per173
functorily in practice.
The modified test would provide a theory to describe the courts'
actual mode of analysis as follows: (1) The court examines each case
in order to discover a "fundamental interest" or a "suspect classification."
"Fundamentalness" or "suspectness" is measured in the abstract, independently of one another.174 (2) The "fundamental interest" is examined
in its relationship to the "suspect classification" in order to see whether the
interest is reasonably subject to that classification. The standard of reasonableness is that of a citizen who is pursuing the interest in question.
Instead of trying to ascertain the necessity of the means the legislature chose
to pursue the state's "compelling interest," the court tests the reasonable
expectations of a citizen with regard to his own legitimate interests 175
would be constitutional. 491 P.2d at 1238. Compare Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J.
Super. at 278 n.21, 287 A.2d at 216 n.2 1 :
If monies are supplied to local districts from general State revenues sufficient
for a "thorough" education, some districts may still desire to add to that sum by
local property taxes. This may reintroduce inequities of various sorts; however,
the issue was not argued, and my decision is not intended to reflect upon it.
169. See e.g., Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) ; Brown v. Board
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
170. See, e.g., Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970) ; Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
171. Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 660 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
172. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
173. The superficial nature of the courts' examinations of the state's "compelling
interest" was treated in the preceding section. See text accompanying notes 161-71
supra.
174. See text accompanying notes 51-160 supra.
175. This analysis bears some similarity to Professor

Michelman's proposed

approach, which looks to the minimum wants of every member of the society. See
notes 140-50 and accompanying text supra.
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(If neither "fundamentalness" nor "suspectness" were found in (1), of
course, the "rational basis test" would apply).
It is submitted that the courts in the instant cases 176 followed this
course without enunciating it. They gave prefunctory allegiance to a final
analysis of "compelling state interests." However, they had already made
clear that education, besides being "fundamental" in an abstract sense, was
at least basic enough that it should not vary purely because of wealth,
and that classification by wealth, besides being "suspect" in an abstract
sense, was at least questionable enough that it should not be the basis for
77

distribution of education.1

The modified test would have two principal advantages over the
present "strict scrutiny" test in addition to describing more accurately
the courts' actual mode of analysis. On the one hand, it would relieve
the court of the task of examining in a virtual vacuum the necessity and
wisdom of legislative plans. 178 On the other hand, it would put a less
heavy burden of proof on the state, without shifting the burden to the
plaintiff, who would have it under the "rational basis test." It accomplishes this by asking the state to confront the asserted individual interests
directly rather than to prove the absence of alternative means to achieve
the state interest, an interest which inevitably pales in significance when
set against deprivation of basic personal needs. 1' 9
VII.

THE ROLE OF THE COURTS

Concern over judicial interference with legislative choice has manifested itself in warnings that education is uniquely the business of state
legislatures and that the considerations are too multi-faceted and com80
plex for the judiciary to handle, not only analytically but remedially.
8
The district court's opinion in Mclnnis capsulized these concerns,' ' and
176. This analysis does not apply to the one case in disagreement - Spano v.
Board of Educ., __ N.Y.2d ___ __ N.E.2d __ __ N.Y.S.2d ___ (Sup. Ct. 1972).
177. While they had reached that conclusion through an abstract analysis of fundamentalness and suspectness, the fact that the courts limited their holdings to condemning the functional relationship between educational quality and wealth lends
strong support to this proposition. See note 226 and accompanying text infra.
178. The problems associated with delineating the boundary between judicial and
legislative functions are treated in the next section. See text accompanying notes
180-91 infra.
179. It is noteworthy that the outcome of each case - the challenged discrimination is struck down or it is not - almost invariably depended upon which test the
court initially chose to apply. Compare Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970),
with Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) ; Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584,
487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971), with McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327
(N.D. Ill. 1968), aff'd mem. sub noma., McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969).
Once the court decided "strict scrutiny" was appropriate, the state was hard put
to show there were no alternatives for achieving its purpose. Cf. text accompanying
notes 161-71 supra.
180. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 680 (1966)
(Harlan & Stewart, JJ., dissenting).
181. 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968). The court there stated:
Evaluation of these variables necessarily requires detailed research and study,
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the Supreme Court's summary affirmance could be taken to indicate a
lack to readiness to attack the issue.' 8 2 However, with the increasing
legal concern over the inequalities in our society, s 3 and particularly with
the development of doctrinal bases in cases such as Serrano, the analytical
tools are by now more familiar, and limits to judicial interference more
easily discernable.
Once the time is determined to be ripe to proclaim the implications
of a constitutional right in a new area, the judiciary has effected extremely
complex remedies. 84 The main difficulty has been to find the sensitive
boundary between legislative and judicial concerns.18 5 It appears that
the public awareness of a need for protection of educational opportunity
has been maturing rapidly and is manifesting itself in numerous legislative
studies of educational systems. 181 On a national scale, and with a view
to legislation, a reevaluation of the burden of local property taxation,
187
particularly as it regressively affects low-income groups, is under way.
88s
Thus, the courts need not fear ineffectiveness or nonacquiescence.
It
8 9
is submitted that while the Supreme Court's decision in Dandridge'
sustained a limit on welfare benefits on the "rational basis test" and may
indicate a deceleration in applying "strict scrutiny," it should be distinguished by the fact that welfare systems are much newer than public
education systems. 190 No public consensus has yet appeared on the fundawith concomitant decentralization so each school and pupil may be individually

evaluated.

Id. at 329 n.4. For similar statements from Burruss v. Wilkerson, 310 F. Supp. 572
(W.D. Va. 1969), see note 84 supra.
182. The Mclnnis court noted that "the contentions [now] presented are novel."
293 F. Supp. at 335.

183. See generally Levi, The University, The Professions, and the Law, 56
L. REV. 251 (1968).

CALIF.

184. See generally notes 56 & 58 supra. But see Kurland, supra note 29, at 595,
where the author explained that desegregation had failed because of lack of public
acquiescence.
185. Cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962), wherein Justice Brennan,
speaking for the Court, stated:
[I]n . . . "political question" cases, it is the relationship between the judiciary
and the coordinate branches of the Federal Government, and not the federal
judiciary's relationship to the States, which gives rise to the "political question."
186. All four of the school finance cases, particularly Serrano and Robinson,
made extensive use of the voluminous studies by government and private agencies, on
state and national levels.
187. President Nixon, in his 1972 State of the Union Address, indicated plans
for a legislative program to alleviate the burden of property taxes for schools. N.Y.
Times, Jan. 23, 1972, § 4, at 1, col. 1. Apparently, there are alternatives to the
financing systems found unacceptable in these cases.
188. Cf. N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1972, § 4, at 3, col. 4:
[New Jersey Governor Cahill's pledge to support a study group expected to
recommend a state income tax] took on added significance last week. A state
court ruled that New Jersey's system of financing public school education
through local property taxes . . . violates . . . constitutional guarantees . ...
The decision, if upheld (as most experts predict it will be), underscores the
urgency of tax reform and bolsters the case for imposing a state income tax.
189. See notes 34-38 and accompanying text supra.
190. The first welfare program in California was instituted in 1937. CAL. WELF.
& INST'NS CODE § 1 (West 1966). The requirement of a system of common schools
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mental rights involved in welfare, nor has there been adequate time even
for experimentation to define the elements which a court must utilize in
testing for a discriminatory effect of welfare programs. 191 Public preoccupation with the burden of property taxes and with the inadequacy of
such a vital service as education suggests that judicial recognition of
the constitutional objections to making one a function of the other is
required.
VIII.

IMPLICATIONS FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT

The advisability of applying the equal protection clause to the area
of educational opportunity cannot be evaluated without an analysis of the
practical effect the Serrano mandate will have on state legislatures and
local government, since such a constitutional doctrine cannot be developed
92
in isolation from the federal system contemplated by the Constitution.1
The limitations which the instant cases place upon the range of choice
available to state legislatures in providing support for their school systems
and upon the means open to them to provide for political choice at lower
levels of government will be the subject of this section.
At the outset, a brief description of the school system of California
as described in Serrano will serve as background for discussion of the
changes required by these cases. Then will follow a consideration of the
merits of state equalization efforts, a close examination of the standards
suggested by these cases, and a proposal as to the minimum changes
required.
The system described in Serrano may be treated as typical of the
systems in all the instant cases. 93 The California state legislature authorwas included in the state constitution of 1849, article 9. CAL. Enuc. CoDE §§ 4, 5 (West
1960). For other ways to distinguish Dandridge on its facts, see notes 34 & 115 and
accompanying text supra.
191. The benefits and costs of welfare programs are still very difficult to assess
or to predict. No indices of the effectiveness of welfare yet command the general
recognition that testing and pupil-teacher ratios do in evaluating education.
192. Cf. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 152 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). But cf. 400 U.S. at 135 (Douglas, J., dissenting in
part).
193. The Van Dusartz court explained:
The recently expired Minnesota system appears structually indistinguishable
in its basic parts from the California system described in the Serrano opinion
334 F. Supp. at 872. The Rodriguez court stated:
[T]he Minimum Foundation Program provides grants for the costs of
salaries, school maintenance and transportation. Eighty percent of the cost of
this program is financed from general State revenue with the remainder apportioned to the school districts in "the Local Fund Assignment."
337 F. Supp. at 281. The court in Robinson stated:
The case is similar to cases in other states, such as California, Minnesota and
Texas. ...

Public schools are financed primarily by local real property taxes augmented
by various forms of "state aid" .....
118 N.J. Super. at 227, 229, 287 A.2d at 189, 190. The Sweetwater court cited
Serrano "as authority for our conclusions in this case." 491 P.2d at 1238. Justice
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ized each county to levy taxes in each school district within the county on
the real property within each school district. 94 The tax base for each
school district was thus limited to the amount of that district's taxable
property. The amount of tax revenue which could be raised was limited
to the annual school budget for each district (but was not required to meet
that budget). The state legislature set a maximum rate, uniform throughout the state, for such taxation, effective unless a majority in a district
voted to be taxed at a higher rate. Because most districts had so voted,
the tax rate in each district was usually set by the district's voters.
This method of school financing provided 55.7 per cent of the total
education revenues in the state in 1968--69.195 The state legislature,
through the State School Fund provided 35.5 per cent, out of general
state tax revenues. The remaining 8.8 per cent was provided from federal
and other sources.
The State School Fund appears to have been designed to assure that
a basic amount, the "foundation program" minimum, uniform throughout
the state, 1 6 was available for each pupil. It accomplished this by supplementing the local taxation system in three ways. 1 97 "Basic state aid"
consisted of grants to each district of a flat uniform sum for each pupil.
Secondly, "equalization aid" filled the gap between the "foundation program" minimum and the sum of "basic state aid" plus the funds which
would have been produced by local taxation if all districts were taxed at
a uniform, hypothetical rate. Thirdly, "supplemental aid" was available
to districts whose voters had chosen to tax themselves above a certain
minimum rate - a high minimum, since this aid was intended to supplement only extremely poor districts.
Turning to the role of these equalization efforts in the asserted denial
of equal protection, it may be noted that the State School Fund "foundation
Parker stated in his dissent, however, that he could not "join either in the rationale
or the result . . . because it purports to utilize the pronouncement in [Serrano], a
case which did not directly relate to the problems raised here ...." Id. at 1240. The
Spano court characterized the plaintiffs' allegations as an "emulation" of Serrano
and rejected that case. __ N.Y.2d at ___ ___ N.E.2d at __ __ N.Y.S.2d at ---.
194. This summary is based on the Serrano court's description. 5 Cal. 3d at 59195, 487 P.2d at 1245-48, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 605-09.
195. Id. at 592 n.2, 487 P.2d at 1246 n.2, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 606 n.2.
196. For minor exceptions based on level of schooling and variations in school
size, see id. at 593 n.6, 487 P.2d at 1246 n.6, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 606 n.6.
197. The Van Dusartz and Rodriguez cases had similar programs involving flat
grants and equalization procedures, each accomplishing some but not enough equalization. The Van Dusartz court stated:
The State has assisted the poorer districts with "equalizing" aid but in
a manner which offsets only a portion of the influence of district wealth
variations.
334 F. Supp. at 872-73. The Rodriguez court stated:
Within this ad valorem taxation system lies the defect which plaintiffs
challenge. This system assumes that the value of property within the various
districts will be sufficiently equal to sustain comparable expenditures from one
district to another. . . . The adverse effects of this erroneous assumption have
been vividly demonstrated ....
337 F. Supp. at 281-82.
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program" appears to indicate a state legislative policy to provide a basic
minimum input 198 per pupil throughout the state. Because this policy
was effectuated, by the "equalization aid,"' 199 and because the plaintiffs
in Serrano made no claim that this minimum was inadequate, 20 0 the
Serrano court did not have to decide whether a basic minimum input per
pupil was constitutionally required.20 1 Therefore, the State School Fund
was not held constitutionally inadequate, but it was still unacceptable for
two reasons. In the first place, the Serrano court noted that "basic state
aid" was meaningless to poor districts and served as a bonus to districts
which did not need "equalization aid."' 20 2 In addition, although the instant cases did not emphasize the fact, it may be noted that "supplemental
aid" put a premium on high tax rates in poor districts, while not encouraging rich districts to choose higher tax rates and thereby to take
a larger part of the school support burden. 20 3 Thus, the "equalization"
program treated rich and poor districts unequally in providing the "founda198. For a discussion of input as the measure of educational quality, see notes
91-99 and accompanying text supra. It can be argued that states have undertaken to

provide minimum education on this basis. See notes 47-50 and accompanying text
supra.
The states, in a sense, are estopped from arguing that cost is not related
to quality, as the reasoning in the instant cases suggests. The Van Dusartz court
stated :
While correlation between expenditure per pupil and the quality of education
may be open to argument, the Court must assume here that it is high. To
do otherwise would be to hold that in those wealthy districts where the per
pupil expenditure is higher . . . the school boards are merely wasting the
taxpayers' money.
334 F. Supp. at 874. The Rodriguez court did not mention the correlation between
input expenditures and quality output, relying, it may be speculated, upon the fact
that the extent of the disparities between per pupil expenditures in different counties
raised a clear inference that quality was affected. The Robinson court did point to
such an inference. It made extensive comparisons between districts based on different
input quality measures, such as teacher-pupil ratios. It compared the average output
of New Jersey schools with the national average, revealing "glaring, exceptional
deficiencies." 118 N.J. Super. at 282, 287 A.2d at 202. The court noted that:
Not all shortcomings are the fault of the school system. The learning of
a pupil from a deprived environment is impeded by many factors. For example,
many pupils come to school hungry . . . . But there is ample evidence in the
record that these limitations can be offset significantly by improved educational
offering.
Id. However, the Robinson court did consider a contrary view, the 1966 Coleman
Report. Id. at 253-54, 287 A.2d at 203. See note 82 supra.
199. See note 197 and accompanying text supra.
200. The Robinson court did discuss adequacy, but the issue was relevant there
primarily due to the state constiutional mandate for a "thorough and efficient system."
118 N.J. Super. at 268, 287 A.2d at 210.
201. There has been much controversy as to whether a basic minimum requirement is or should be an indispensible part of equal protection analysis. See notes
140-48 and accompanying text supra.
202. The Serrano court stated that "basic aid . . . actually widens the gap between rich and poor districts." 5 Cal. 3d at 594, 487 P.2d at 1248, 96 Cal. Rptr. at
608; accord, 334 F. Supp. at 873 (the guaranteed minimum acts "as a unique bonus
solely for the benefit of rich districts") ; 337 F. Supp. at 282 ("Any mild equalizing
effects that state aid may have do not benefit the poorest districts").
203. The Robinson court considered the impact of state-offered incentives to
local tax effort and the problem of districts relying on state aid. Cf. note 212 infra.
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tion program" minimum. Secondly, even if "equalization aid" were offered
on an equal basis, it failed to dispose of the unequal effect - educational
quality varying with district wealth - of the taxation system.20 4 This
unequal effect is the heart of the instant cases, since they require that
the states institute systems which do not tend to have such an effect.
The choices available to a state depend upon exactly how broadly or
narrowly courts will interpret the instant cases. The plaintiffs in Serrano
made two principal claims. 2 'The court stated the first claim as follows:
The first cause alleges in substance as follows: Plaintiff children attend
public.., schools .... This public school system is maintained throughout California by a financing plan or scheme which relies heavily on
local property taxes and causes substantial disparities among individual
school districts in the amount of revenue available per pupil for the
districts' educational programs. Consequently, districts with smaller
tax bases are not able to spend as much money 20per
child for educa6
tion as districts with larger assessed valuations.
It is difficult to discern2 0 7 whether the evil lies with: (1) the disparities
in revenue, requiring a standard herein characterized as "equalization of
per pupil input;" or (2) the inability to spend amounts equal to other
counties, requiring a standard herein characterized as "tax base equalization ;" or (3) the disparities caused by the heavy reliance on local property
taxes, requiring a standard herein characterized as "release from tax
dependence." The second claim made by the Serrano plaintiffs was that
residents of poor districts were required to tax themselves at a higher rate
than were residents of wealthy districts to achieve the same educational
quality input.20 s This claim seems to address itself solely to "tax base
equalization."
A.

Under Serrano as Broadly Interpreted

The broadest interpretation of Serrano would require "equalization
of per pupil input." It would be principally derived from the Serrano
court's statement of its holding on the first claim:
[W]e are satisfied that plaintiff children have alleged facts showing
that the public school financing system denies them equal protection
204. See, e.g., Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. at 270, 287 A.2d at 211,

wherein the court found that the newly passed legislative equalization effort, the
Bateman Act, did not go far enough. Judge Botter wrote: "I conclude, therefore,

that the Bateman Act as presently funded does not meet the State constitutional

standard .... Id. Cf. note 197 supra.
205. A third claim was that an adjudicable controversy existed as to the
validity of the finance system. See 5 Cal. 3d at 618, 487 P.2d at 1266, 96 Cal. Rptr.
at 626.
206. Id. at 590, 487 P.2d at 1244, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 604.
207. The court quoted the plaintiffs' claim at length, saying that the "financing
scheme thus fails .. .in several specified respects." Id. at 590, 487 P.2d at 1244-45,
96 Cal. Rptr. at 604 (citation omitted). Because of the demurrer nature of the case,
the court was not obliged to delineate an exact standard, but only to find a colorable
claim.
208. Id. at 590-91, 487 P.2d at 1245, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 604-06.
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of the laws because it produces substantial disparities among
20 9 school
districts in the amount of revenue available for education.
This language requires, if taken alone, that an amount uniform throughout
the state be available to each district according to the number of its pupils.

This suggests that a state would have to finance state schools wholly
from general funds distributed to school districts in the same way "equalization aid" is now distributed. 210 Three principal effects on local government would result: (1) Property taxes would still be a valid way to
raise school revenue, 21 1 but value assessments would have to be made
on a uniform rather than local basis - to prevent districts from using
low assessments to shift more of the burden of educational support to the
state. 212 (2) Local governments would have no control over the amount
of money to be spent on education within their boundaries; that is, the
value of education relative to other priorities would be a question solely
for the state legislature.2 1 3 It will be noted that the local government
would not be told where to put education in determining its budgetary
priorities; on the contrary, education would be wholly removed from
consideration in local budgetary decisions. 214 (3) The administration of
education would be centralized, to the extent that local governments would
not be able to choose to give more funds per pupil to one district than
another, whether for need, experimentation or whatever, because the state
would be obliged to distribute funds to each district on a per pupil basis. 215
It is submitted that such a broad interpretation of the instant cases
is unwarranted. An examination of the Serrano opinion supports this
conclusion. In the first place, the Serrano court's holding on the first
209. Id. at 618, 487 P.2d at 1265, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 626.
210. The Sweetwater court came closest to applying this broad reading of
Serrano. That court proposed a system in which the state would determine the
total amount of funds needed for state schools, would "notify the county commissioners what mill levy must be levied," and would "notify the state treasurer what
proportion of these funds must go to each school district" in order that each district
"will receive the same share per classroom unit." 491 P.2d at 1238 (emphasis added).
"Classroom unit" is a statutory measuring unit for "minimum educational needs
for foundation program purposes." WYo. STAT. ANN. § 21.1-228(b) (Supp. 1971).
The court specified that a different unit might be used and made a significant exception
to equalizing allowing local bond issues for capital improvements. It also
suggested that local initiative could raise input expenditures to 15 per cent above
the equalized level. See note 231 infra.
211. The Sweetwater court's proposed plan included a state-wide property tax.
491 P.2d at 1238.
212. The Robinson court, in examining the Bateman Act in light of the federal
equal protection clause, noted that even though it went "far toward equalizing the
revenue-raising power of local districts . . . [it] equalize[d] only to a given level . . .
[with] no assurance that local officials . . . will use the added aid for improved education by increasing budgets appreciably; they may simply use the aid to help keep
tax rates down." 118 N.J. Super. at 272, 287 A.2d at 212-13.
213. Cf. note 210 supra.
214. For a discussion of the proposition that education is removed from market
pricing, see notes 43, 140 & 144 supra.
215. Cf. note 210 supra. Presumably districts would have some discretion in
allocating funds among particular schools.
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claim must doubtless be read in the context of the court's statement of
that claim.2 16 Secondly, the court stated that it did not have to decide
the issue of whether a state could leave to local governments some control
over the budgetary priority of education - what the court called "fiscal
freewill" 217 - because the state had effectively denied this control to some
counties and therefore could not be heard to argue that this was its
"compelling state interest. ' 21 8 It seems that the court would not have
reserved this question if it had considered that the answer was necessarily
' 219
implied from its holding. Thirdly, the court's discussion of "uniformity,
in answer to the defendants' contention that "territorial uniformity" could
not be required, did not clarify what kind of "uniformity" was to be
required, except "territorial uniformity in respect to the present financing
system." It would appear that this language would not require uniform
per pupil expenditure but only uniform effect from the financing system
which was adopted; that is, such financing would not cause variations in
per pupil expenditure. 220 Fourthly, the court affirmed the importance of
local control 221 as to how money was to be spent -

the allocation of

educational funds within the local government unit. Fifthly, if "substantial
disparities" alone violated equal protection, that principle would indeed
"spell the destruction of local government" 222 in all but superficial activities,
once vital services such as police and fire protection were designated
"fundamental" for equal protection purposes, as might be suggested by
Hawkins v. Town of Shaw,223 which held that a town was obliged not
to treat racial classes differently in the provision of important municipal
services. 224 But the Serrano court, disclaiming any "such dire consequences," declined to speculate further, and in so doing, characterized the
principle being established as a command that "the relative wealth of school
districts may not determine the quality of public education. '225 Finally,
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

See note 206 and accompanying text supra.
5 Cal. 3d at 611, 487 P.2d at 1260, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 620.
Id. Accord, 118 N.J. Super. at 271-72, 287 A.2d at 212.
5 Cal. 3d at 610-13, 487 P.2d at 1260-61, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 619-22.
Cf. note 226 and accompanying text infra.

The court noted:
The individual district may well be in the best position to decide whom
to hire, how to schedule its educational offerings, and a host of other matters
which are either of significant local impact or of such a detailed nature as to
require decentralized determination. . . . No matter how the state decides to
finance its system . . . it can still leave this decision-making power in the

hands of local districts.
5 Cal. 3d at 610, 487 P.2d at 1260, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 620.
222. This was the defendants' contention. Id. at 614, 487 P.2d at 1262, 96 Cal.
Rptr. at 622.
223. 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971).
224. See note 67 supra.
225. 5 Cal. 3d at 613-14, 487 P.2d at 1262-63, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 622.
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none of the instant cases interpreting Serrano has given it such an
expansive reading. 226
B.

Under Serrano as Narrowly Interpreted

The narrowest interpretation of Serrano seems to consider the first
holding in that case merely as a broad statement of the second holding,
which established a standard of "tax base equalization."2 27 This interpretation is offered by Professor Coons, 228 who has been instrumental in
bringing these issues before the courts. 229 It would require that an amount

uniform through the state would be available per pupil, for each particular
rate at which a district chose to be taxed. Further, it would eliminate the
variation in tax effectiveness which results when a resident's 2 per cent
tax provides more funds per pupil in a wealthy district than in a poor one,
and it would require that a state institute programs which would equalize
the effective per pupil tax base of all districts in the state. The effects upon
local government would resemble those under the broad interpretation
with respect to (1) - value assessments would have to be made on a
uniform basis if property taxes were retained, so that the same rate of
tax would put an equivalent obligation on persons with similar property
throughout the state. It would differ with respect to (2) and (3) - local
governments would retain complete control over the budgetary priority
of education, and the administration of education would not be centralized;
that is, the state programs would distribute funds to local governments
to then be distributed among the districts as they chose.
It appears that the instant cases might be limited to this interpretation,
principally for the reason 230 that the Serrano court reserved the question
226. The Robinson court most clearly rejected this interpretation. It stated:

This is not to suggest that the same amount of money must be spent on
each pupil in the State. The differing needs of pupils would suggest the contrary
....
[An earlier New Jersey decision stated in dictum] that benefits "may indeed
depend upon the district of a student's residence," [but that there remained] the
question whether the State statutory scheme may, because of local failures,
become unequal to the constitutional promise and command.
118 N.J. Super. at 273-74, 287 A.2d at 213. The Rodriguez court stated:
In the instant case plaintiffs have not advocated that educational expenditure be equal for each child. Rather, they have recommended the application
of the principle of "fiscal neutrality." Briefly summarized, this standard requires that the quality of public education may not be a function of wealth,
other than the wealth of the state as a whole. Unlike the measure offered in
Mclnnis, this proposal does not involve the Court in the intricacies of affirmatively
requiring that expenditures be made in a certain manner or amount. On the
contrary, the State may adopt the financial scheme desired so long as the variations in wealth among the governmentally chosen units do not affect spending
for the education of any child.

337 F. Supp. at 283-84. But cf. note 210 srupra.

227. See notes 206-08 and accompanying text supra.
228. See Coons, Clune & Sugarman, supra note 60. The authors advocate "power
equalizing" to give each district an equal tax base per pupil for education purposes.
Id. at 319-21.
229. See Wall Street Journal, Mar. 13, 1972, at 18, col. 1.
230. See note 217 and accompanying text supra.
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whether a state could leave with local governments the control over the
amount of money spent on education in a district. In addition, none of

''231
the instant cases made statements condemning such "fiscal free will.

However, it is submitted that this interpretation is more restrictive than
the thrust of the instant cases suggests and that, if faced with the issue,
a court following this thrust would not find such "fiscal free will" "compelling" where a "fundamental interest" like education was concerned.
It is possible that courts may never be called upon to decide that issue,
since few states, if any, have pursued the interest in "fiscal free will"
with any consistency. 232 The issue seems likely to arise only if wealthy
local government units insist that their states pursue the interest consistently, by adopting a program on Coons' model, in order to preserve
the "fiscal free will" that they, as wealthy districts, have been able to
enjoy.23 3 Whether the issue will require judicial resolution or not, it is
submitted that the enormous emphasis which the instant cases placed on
the importance of education 234 leads one to conclude that the state interest
231. However, the Sweetwater court stated:
Even if the pupil assessed valuations were fairly well equalized within a multipledistrict county, it could . . . materially change from year to year, which would
require a constant changing or gerrymandering of properties from one district
to another.
491 P.2d at 1237. The Robinson court stated:
Poor districts have other competing needs for local revenue. The evidence
shows that poorer districts spend a smaller proportion of their total revenues for
school purposes. The demand for municipal services tends to diminish further
the school revenue-raising power of poor districts. Another general disadvantage of poor districts is the fact that property taxes are regressive; they
impose burdens in inverse proportion to ability to pay. This is because poor people
spend a larger proportion of their income for housing.
118 N.J. Super. 273, 287 A.2d at 213. Thus it appears that even with power
equalizing, other financial considerations would have unpredictable and often undesirable effects on the determination of the tax rate.
The Robinson court, of all the courts, most clearly rejected variable tax
rates, but was motivated to do so partly by the New Jersey constitutional provision.
See id. at 277, 287 A. 2d at 215. The court also stated:
There is no compelling justification for making a taxpayer in one district
pay a tax at a higher rate than a taxpayer in another district, so long as the
revenue serves the common state educational purpose.
Id. at 278, 287 A.2d at 216 (footnote omitted). Furthermore, the court did not
intend to decide the question of whether, once state revenues provided equal "thorough"
education, local districts could contribute more funds through local taxes. Id. at 278
n.21, 287 A.2d at 216 n.21. However, this question seems to have been decided
implicitly in the instant case by the court's conclusions as to federal equal protection:
Education serves too important a function to leave it also to the mood in some cases to the low aspirations - of the taxpayers of a given district ....
Id. at 279, 287 A.2d at 216. It is not always clear whether these conclusions are
compelled by state, federal, or both constitutions. Finally the court characterized the
legislative duty as "equalizing tax burdens." Id. at 281, 287 A.2d at 217.
232. See note 161 and accompanying text supra.
233. Cf. Wall Street Journal, Mar. 2, 1972, at 18, col. 5:
Lawyers say it's entirely possible to satisfy the Serrano standard merely
by redrawing school-district lines, or consolidating districts, to give every
district roughly the same tax base. It's possible - but highly unlikely. It amounts
to reslicing the pie without making it larger. Better-off districts would lose
chunks of their tax base.
234. See text accompanying notes 51-102 supra.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1972

31

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 5 [1972], Art. 4
MAY

1972]

COMMENTS

in education is likely to encompass an interest in the best education that
a state can offer to all its citizens. Thus, the many factors wholly irrelevant
to education which must go into determination of local government budgetary priorities should not affect an individual's educational opportunity.
235
The Robinson court explicitly espoused this proposition.
C.

Under a "Release from Tax Dependence" Interpretation of Serrano

It is submitted that "release from tax dependence" best describes the
standard which the instant cases establish,236 although the cases are probably inconclusive for the reasons discussed above. 23 7 This interpretation
falls between the broad and narrow interpretations just described. It
requires that a state institute programs which assure that an amount
uniform throughout the state will be available to each local government
on the basis of the number of its pupils. Essentially a negative mandate, 238
it requires that the state insure that the wealth of a school district is not
a factor in the decision of how much money will be available per pupil in
that district. This interpretation resembles the other two with respect
to (1) - property taxes would be permissible, but assessments would
have to be on a uniform state-wide basis. It differs from the narrow
interpretation, however, in regard to (2) - local governments would not
have control of the budgetary priority of education. 239 It differs also
from the broad interpretation on issue (3) - the administration of
education would not be required to be centralized, because the state
programs could distribute funds to local governments to be distributed
as they chose in the education area. The latter result derives from the
fact that, unlike "equalization of per pupil input," this interpretation
emphasizes educational policy as a local government function, instead of
one with full responsibility lying with the state. 240 The effect of this
235. See note 231 supra.
236. See text accompanying notes 172-79 supra.
237. See text accompanying note 174 supra. See also note 207 supra.
238. See note 165 and accompanying text supra.
239. It may be argued that the state involvement demanded by the Serrano
decision is different only in degree from the present involvement. The Rodriguez
court opined that "[t]he type of socialized education, not the question of its existence,
is the only matter currently in dispute." 337 F. Supp. at 284.
Under the New Jersey system, the legislature had already found it necessary
to review local school budgets. Cf. 118 N.J. at 258, 287 A.2d at 205.

Local control can be maintained, according to the McElroy Commission:

"Local boards of education should be given wide latitude, within general state
guidelines, to use resources provided by the state in ways that best meet their

demands." . . . States already contribute heavily, but to varying degrees, to
support of public schools and consequently have some say in how the money is
spent.

N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1972, § E, at 3, cols. 1-2.

240. In Robinson, the court stated:
Although districts can be created and classified for appropriate purposes, it
was held .. .that the state school tax remained a state tax even though assessed
and levied locally upon local property, with revenues returned by the State
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interpretation, then, on important municipal services which might in the
future be designated as "fundamental interests, ' 24 1 would be to require
that local governments do not base their decisions with respect to allocation
of these services upon the relative financial status of their subdivisions.
From the preceding analysis, it appears that a state school financing
system based on property taxes would probably be acceptable under the
instant cases if it required: (a) a uniform assessment of property value;
(b) a uniform rate of taxation earmarked for education; and (c) that the
state-wide average amount raised per pupil would be the amount to be
redistributed to each local government unit on the basis of the number of
its pupils.
The practical effects of uniform assessment and uniform tax rates
242
on residential patterns, industry location, and other social patterns
are beyond the scope of this Comment. However, should a state decide
that other forms of raising revenue were preferable to any such effects, the
third requirement would be the decisive one. In either case, the principal
thrust of this last requirement is that wealthier local government units
will be contributing to the support of functions of poorer local government
units. 243 Though this result would be novel perhaps to the operational
concept of the independence of local governments in their local affairs, it
is submitted that it comports with the constitutional concept that local
governments derive their original authority from their state and that,

to local districts. The court held that prior to the 1875 amendment [which
added the education clause to the state constitution] public schools were a matter
of local rather than state concern, but that the amendment made the support of
public schools a state concern.
118 N.J. Super. 268, 287 A.2d at 210 (emphasis supplied by the court).
241.

Cf. notes 61, 67, & 91-94 and accompanying text supra.

242. Cf., e.g., 118 N.J. Super. at 242-44, 287 A.2d at 197-98:
Other comparisons can be made. Industrial and commercial property distributions were studied by Neil Gold, Director of the Suburban Action Institute.
He testified that 112 municipalities with 11% of the State's population had
commercial and industrial property almost equal in value to that possessed by a
group of municipalities containing 39% of the State's population. The first group
raised only $62 million in taxes compared with $262 million by the second group.
The first group raised these taxes at a tax rate under 2% while the poorer
groups taxed at rates of 6% or more. Yet most of the poorer communities
must serve people of greater need because they have large numbers of dependent
minorities. ...
Wealthy suburbs are able to attract industry from central cities by preferential
tax rates. ...
Rising tax rates in cities compel compromises in funding services for education and other purposes.
Neil Gold has concluded that Serrano's "likely effect on industrial location 'in the
long run, by all odds [is] its most important' consequence." Wall Street Journal,
March 13, 1972, at 1, col. 6.
243. Cf. 337 F. Supp. at 282. The court noted that the reverse existed in the
present system:
There was expert testimony to the effect that the current system tends to subsidize
the rich at the expense of the poor, rather than the other way around.
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consequentially, the unequal effects of local government boundaries fall

2 44
subject to the state's responsibility under the equal protection clause.

IX.

CONCLUSION

Serrano v. Priest, and the cases it has inspired thus far, have spearheaded a judicial attack, under the equal protection clause, on unequal
treatment of poorer neighborhoods in the provision of public education.
Virtually all states face similar factual situations, and the Supreme Court,
as final interpreter of the equal protection clause, has been called upon to
decide the issue.

245

The cases have followed the judicial practice under the equal protection doctrine of measuring the affected private interest to see if it is
"fundamental," of looking to the legislative classification to see if it is
"suspect," and of requiring the state to show a "compelling interest" which
necessitates such a classification with respect to a private interest if either
of the initial inquiries was answered in the affirmative. On the one hand,
the cases have relied on a basis doctrinally sound both in precedent and
reasoning. It would appear that education is a vital service which should
not be withheld, except with good reason, and that wealth is a questionable basis on which to allow basic governmental services to be allocated.
By limiting their holdings to condemnation of the concurrence of these
two factors, the courts appear well within the bounds of the equal protection doctrine. On the other hand, the failure of the courts in these
cases to illuminate the standards used to judge "fundamental" or "suspect"
status, has left open the question of the future scope of such analyses. At
the same time, the judicial reluctance to pass judgment upon the importance or wisdom of decisions by the legislative branch, has inevitably
led to the placing of great emphasis on these initial inquiries. It appears
that a method for testing the rationality of the relationship between the
private interest and the legislative classification would better reflect that
emphasis and might give more guidance as to how other private interests
may be legitimately affected by legislative decisions.
As far as can be determined from these cases, which are essentially
negative in their mandates, it appears that the standard which an acceptable school financing system must meet is that it insulate education from
the budgetary considerations of local governments, probably by means of
a state-wide revenue-raising procedure and by distribution of funds to
each local government unit on the basis of the number of pupils within
its bounds.
Randall C. Rolfe
244. Cf. Froelich v. City of Cleveland, 99 Ohio 376, 124 N.E. 212 (1919). The
relationship between the state's laws and municipal laws which had been passed
pursuant to home-rule provisions in the state constitution, along with a limited analogy
to the federal system, was the subject of a poignant discussion by the Ohio court.
245. See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
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